Extension of Preferences to an Ordered Set

If a decision maker prefers x to y to z, would he choose orderd set [x;z] or [y;x]? This article studies extension of preferences over individual alternatives to an ordered set which is prevalent in closed ballot elections with proportional representation and other real life problems where the decision maker is to choose from groups with an associated hierarchy inside. I introduce ve ordinal decision rules: highest-position, top-q, lexicographic order, max-best, highest-of-best rules and provide axiomatic characterization of them. I also investigate the relationship between ordinal decision rules and the expected utility rule. In particular, whether some ordinal rules induce the same (weak) ranking of ordered sets as the expected utility rule

Voting and Information Aggregation in Parliamentary and Semi-Presidential Democracies

This paper investigates legislation in parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies where the legislature and the president have formal role in legislation. A proposed law is first voted in the legislature and if it passes, comes to the consideration of the president. I study two prevalent legislative procedures: (i) Single-round legislation where the president's action is final, (ii) Two-round legislation the president's approval enacts the law but after his veto proposal returns to the legislature for rediscussion. In this setup I examine power balance and the efficiency of information aggregation. For this I build a model of strategic voting with incomplete information and analyze different ideological profiles of the president and the homogenous legislature. The president seems powerless in two-round legislation but in equilibrium there are instances he can change the legislation result. Power struggle arises only when the legislature is modernist and the president is conservative. If the legislature is conservative and the president is modernist, the president has no impact on the outcome, but adversely affects informational efficiency. If they have the same ideological bias, the presidential institution is beneficial and the president's existence provides full information aggregation with finite legislature size in single-round legislation. Above results can be generalized to heterogeneous legislature with two types, except full information aggregation is never achieved.Voting, Information aggregation efficiency, Ideological bias, Power, Unicameral, Parliamentary, Semi-presidential, Democracy

Voting and Information Aggregation in Parliamentary and Semi-Presidential Democracies

This paper investigates legislation in parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies where the legislature and the president have formal role in legislation. A proposed law is first voted in the legislature and if it passes, comes to the consideration of the president. I study two prevalent legislative procedures: (i) Single-round legislation where the president's action is final, (ii) Two-round legislation the president's approval enacts the law but after his veto proposal returns to the legislature for rediscussion. In this setup I examine power balance and the efficiency of information aggregation. For this I build a model of strategic voting with incomplete information and analyze different ideological profiles of the president and the homogenous legislature. The president seems powerless in two-round legislation but in equilibrium there are instances he can change the legislation result. Power struggle arises only when the legislature is modernist and the president is conservative. If the legislature is conservative and the president is modernist, the president has no impact on the outcome, but adversely affects informational efficiency. If they have the same ideological bias, the presidential institution is beneficial and the president's existence provides full information aggregation with finite legislature size in single-round legislation. Above results can be generalized to heterogeneous legislature with two types, except full information aggregation is never achieved

The Impact of Population Ageing on Technological Progress and TFP Growth, with Application to United States: 1950-2050

I examine the effect of age-distribution of the society on economic growth through technological progress. I build a multisector economy model that involves population pyramid. I characterize the steady-state of the model for low and high population growth rate. Higher population growth rate yields faster TFP and output growth in the long-run. I analyze dynamic behavior of the economy. I calibrate the model for United States, 1950-2000 and using the estimated parameters I make predictions about the impact of population ageing on economic growth

Reasoning about Qualitative Direction and Distance between Extended Objects using Answer Set Programming

In this thesis, we introduce a novel formal framework to represent and reason about qualitative direction and distance relations between extended objects using Answer Set Programming (ASP). We take Cardinal Directional Calculus (CDC) as a starting point and extend CDC with new sorts of constraints which involve defaults, preferences and negation. We call this extended version as nCDC. Then we further extend nCDC by augmenting qualitative distance relation and name this extension as nCDC+. For CDC, nCDC, nCDC+, we introduce an ASP-based general framework to solve consistency checking problems, address composition and inversion of qualitative spatial relations, infer unknown or missing relations between objects, and find a suitable configuration of objects which fulfills a given inquiry.Comment: In Proceedings ICLP 2019, arXiv:1909.0764

Reasoning about Cardinal Directions between 3-Dimensional Extended Objects using Answer Set Programming

We propose a novel formal framework (called 3D-nCDC-ASP) to represent and reason about cardinal directions between extended objects in 3-dimensional (3D) space, using Answer Set Programming (ASP). 3D-nCDC-ASP extends Cardinal Directional Calculus (CDC) with a new type of default constraints, and nCDC-ASP to 3D. 3D-nCDC-ASP provides a flexible platform offering different types of reasoning: Nonmonotonic reasoning with defaults, checking consistency of a set of constraints on 3D cardinal directions between objects, explaining inconsistencies, and inferring missing CDC relations. We prove the soundness of 3D-nCDC-ASP, and illustrate its usefulness with applications. This paper is under consideration for acceptance in TPLP.Comment: Paper presented at the 36th International Conference on Logic Programming (ICLP 2020), University Of Calabria, Rende (CS), Italy, September 2020, 29 pages, 6 figure

The Impact of Population Ageing on Technological Progress and TFP Growth, with Application to United States: 1950-2050 (Working Paper)

Abstract I examine the e¤ect of age-distribution of the society on economic growth through technological progress. I build a multisector economy model that involves population pyramid. I characterize the steady-state of the model for low and high population growth rate. Higher population growth rate yields faster TFP and output growth in the long-run. I analyze dynamic behavior of the economy. I calibrate the model for United States, 1950-2000 and using the estimated parameters I make predictions about the impact of population ageing on economic growth. JEL Numbers: J11, O11, O32, O33, O4

Voting and Information Aggregation in Unicameral Parliamentary and Semi-Presidential Democracies

Abstract This paper investigates legislation in parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies where the legislature and the president have formal role in legislation. A proposed law is …rst voted in the legislature and if it passes, comes to the consideration of the president. I study two prevalent legislative procedures: (i) Single-round legislation where the president's action is …nal, (ii) Two-round legislation the president's approval enacts the law but after his veto proposal returns to the legislature for rediscussion. In this setup I examine power balance and the e¢ ciency of infor- JEL Numbers: D72, D7